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1. The Present Perfect-Evidential Connection 
In a number of languages from various language families, the morphology of the 
present perfect or a form historically derived from the present perfect, expresses a 
particular evidential category, one that indicates the availability of indirect evidence 
for the truth of a proposition (the exact interpretation i s  discussed in more detai l  in 
the next two sections) . l  The phenomenon, to which I give the name PERFECT OF 
EVIDENTIALITY (PE), i s  i l lustrated in ( I ) : 
( I )  a. Gel -mi� -im. 
come PERF 1 SG 
b .  Az sam dosal.  
I be- I sG, PRES come-p.PART 
c. Jeg har kommet. 
I have- I sG, PRES come-P.PART 
'I have come . '  
' I  apparently came . '  





( 1  a) is an example ofthe historical connection between present perfect and evidential 
in Turkish :  the inflected verb has the morphology of the present perfect but in the 
contemporary language the sentence is  interpreted only as a perfect of evidentiality 
(i .e .  indirect evidential) (m1$ sti l l  has a perfect meaning in non-finite environments 
as well as in the presence of future or past tense, as discussed later on) . The sentences 
in ( 1  b, c) are ambiguous between present perfects and perfects of evidentiality. In 
English, sentential modification by apparent�v renders quite closely the second 
interpretation. In both English and in the languages with the perfect of evidentiality, 
the indirect evidential interpretation allows both a report and an inference reading; 
i .e. both Apparently p and poPE are interpreted as either It is said that p or as I 
infer that p2 . Note that in the case of the perfect of evidentiality, the morphology 
of the present perfect alone brings about the evidential interpretation; there i s  no 
QUOTATION- or INFERENCE-morpheme and no embedding under verbs of saying or 
of inference. Furthermore, the interpretation is  independent of the p articular form 
of the present perfect: synthetic, as in ( I  a), formed with a be-auxiliary, as i n  ( I  b),  
or with a have-auxi liary, as in ( l C).3 
Because the perfect of evidentiality i s  observed in languages that are not all 
genetically related or geographically proximate, it is  quite unlikely that the present 
perfect-evidential connection is  just a case of accidental syncretism. In fact, it i s  
possible to  rule out on empirical grounds the possibi lity that the specific forms 
involved are lexically ambiguous .  There are at least four counterexamples to a 
potential claim that the PE-morphology, e .g.  mI$ in Turkish (or auxi l iary plus 
past participle in languages with analytic perfects), i s  simp ly ambiguous between 
a PERFECT and an INDIRECT EVIDENTIAL interpretation. In the case of the English 
apparent/supposed/alleged/reported, which have report and/or inference as p art of 
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their lexical meaning, thi s  meaning is always present regardless of the syntactic 
configuration in which the morphemes appear: as modifier adjectives, adverbials, 
or embedding (finite or not) predicates. To see this, consider the sentences below: 
(2) a. John is  an apparentlsupposed/alleged/reported thief. 
b .  John is  apparently/supposedly/allegedly/reportedly a thief. 
c .  John appears/is supposed/is alleged/is reported to be a thief. 
d. For it to appear that John is a thief one would have to tell a lot of lies. 
In the languages with the perfect of evidentiality, however, the evidential 
interpretation is  unavailable in any other syntactic configuration but the one identical 
to (or derived from) the present perfect. In Turkish, for instance, when -mI� 
forms NP-modifying participles, the interpretation of indirect evidential i s  absent. 
Consider (3) (from Siobin and Ak�u 1 982): 
(3) ol-mii� adam 
dead man 
= ' dead man ' 
# ' a  man who i s  apparently dead ' 
Similarly, when -mI� i s  involved in the formation of the past or the future perfect, 
the interpretation of evidentiality does not arise (cf. (4) and (5».  
(4) Gel -mi� -tim. 
come PERF I SG . PAST 
= ' I  had come. ' 
# ' I  apparently came/had come. ' 
(5) Gel -mi� 01 -acak -1m. 
come PERF be FUT I SG 
= 'I will have come . '  
# ' 1  will apparently come. '  
Finally, in  non-finite clauses the presence of -mI!j is not enough to bring about the 
indirect evidential interpretation : 
(6) Kitap yaz -ml� 01 -mak biiyiik bir ba�an . 
book write PERF be INF big a achievement. 
= ' To have written a book is a big achievement. '  
# 'To have apparently written a book i s  a big achievement . '  
In sum, the facts about the avai lable interpretation for the past and future 
perfects, the non-finite perfect, and for the adjectival perfect participle argue against 
the possibility that the meaning of indirect evidentiality is a lexical idiosyncrasy 
of the morphemes involved (the same facts obtain for the languages with analytic 
perfects) . Thus we can definitively rule out the possibility that what we have at 
hand is simply an accidental syncretism (unlikely as thi s hypothesis was, given 
the cross- linguisti c  di stribution of the phenomenon). We can furthermore draw 
two conclusions: ( i )  the anchoring of the perfect meaning to the present tense i s  
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significant for deriving the indirect evidential interpretation, and (ii) the reason for 
the morphological syncretism must be sought in the semantics of the present perfect 
and the indirect evidential; i .e .  the two must share some feature(s) which receive 
identical morpho-phonological realization . The goal of thi s  paper is to first provide 
a semantics for indirect evidentials and then to identify the elements in  the semantics 
of the present perfect, as composed of present tense and perfect aspect, that give 
rise to the interpretation of indirect evidentiality. 
The phenomenon of the perfect of evidentiality is of interest for a number of 
reasons. First, the syncretism of forms poses a problem for theories  treating tense, 
aspect and modality as independent. A theory which integrates these, identifying 
common elements in their semantics and representing these elements syntactically, 
is clearly to be preferred. Such a conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that 
the present perfect-evidential connection is not the only example of a morphological 
collapse of temporal and modal categories. A more familiar case in  the literature 
is the counterfactual role of past tense (Isard 1 974, Lyons 1 977; cf. Iatridou 1 996 
for an analysis in terms of a common function taking time intervals or possible 
worlds as arguments). The existence of both the past-counterfactual and present 
perfect-evidential links suggests that there is a general pattern of integration between 
temporal and modal categories. Finally, the phenomenon of the perfect of eviden­
tiality and evidentiaJity itself as a grammatical category are virtually unknown in the 
theoretical literature; setting the beginning of their formal investigation, therefore, 
is of interest for theories of syntax-semantics and syntax-morphology mappings in 
the domain of modality. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I discuss cvi­
dentiality as a linguistic category. In section 3 I examine the meaning of indirect 
evidentials, like the perfect of evidentiality and like English apparentZv. Essentially, 
I analyze them as epistemic modals with a universal modal force and a more re­
stricted domain of quantification than that of 'ordinary ' epistemic operators. Section 
4 discusses the temporal and aspectual interpretation of PE statements and estab­
lishes that the present perfect morphology has a strictly modal function and does 
not contribute to the temporal and aspectual specification of the core proposition .  
Section 5 proposes an analysis of the semantic contribution of the present perfect . 
2. Evidentiality 
Evidentiality is a linguistic category encoding speaker-orientcd qualifications of 
propositions along two dimensions: (i) in terms of the evidence they are based 
on, e.g. DIRECT (visual/auditory, etc.) or INDIRECT (report or inference), and (i i)  
with respect to the speaker 's commitment to their truth « dis)beJief/agnosticism) (cf. 
Chafe and Nichols 1 986 for discussion and case studies).4 The two dimensions -
whether the proposition i s  based on perceptual evidence and whether the speaker 
believes in its truth - are logically independent. Yet natural language typically treats 
propositions based on perceptual evidence on the part of the speaker as propositions 
asserted by the speaker to be true; similarly, if a speaker marks a proposition as 
based not .on first-hand evidence, he or she typically expresses non-commitment to 
the truth of the proposition . This  i s  why it is more useful to think of the terms DIRECT 
and INDIRECT (which appear to be the generally accepted ones in the literature on 
evidentiality) as making a distinction based not on whether or not the evidence is 
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perceptual, but on whether or not the evidence justifies the speaker 's belief in a 
proposition.5 
Many (perhaps all) languages have a way of expressing the status of the 
speaker 's presentation of the truth of propositions. Some languages express evi­
dentia l  distinctions lexically. English, for example, encodes evidentiality by using 
embedding verbs and different adverbials to express various types of evidence for 
the truth of a particular proposition and various degrees of speaker ' s  commitment 
to that truth. To i llustrate with an example, the proposition p, John was singing, 
can be lexically modified to reflect the speaker 's source of evidence and/or attitude 
towards its validity. Thus the sentences in (7a) express the fact that the speaker 
has perceptual evidence for the truth of p whereas (7b) and (7c) mark the evidence 
as indirect, the sentences being interpreted as reports of p or as inferences about 
p. The report or inference interpretation is lexically determined in (7b), i .e .  the 
sentences are not ambiguous with respect to the type of evidence involved; whereas 
apparent(v in (7c) is underspecified as to the exact type of indirect evidence. 
(7) a. I saw/heard John singing. (direct evidence: vi sual/auditory) 
b. I see/hear (that) John was singing. (indirect evidence: inference/report) 
c. John was apparently singing. (indirect evidence: inference or report) 
In addition to expressing the source of evidence, the sentences in (7) also trigger 
inferences about how certain the speaker is of the truth of p. The sentences in 
(7a) under normal circumstances entai l that the speaker has a justified belief in p, 
i .e .  knows p, or more accurately, has come to know p (they also entai l p, for that 
matter) . This, of course, is not a logical entailment, as it is quite easy to imagine 
situations in which the speaker 's perceptions are often misleading and the speaker 
knows it; in such situations (7a) would entai l neither p, nor that the speaker believes 
p.  Regarding (7b, c), there i s  a difference in the interpretation available to reports 
and inferences with respect to the speaker 's  attitude to the truth of p. Whereas 
reports simply express that the speaker is  not committed to the truth of p, i .e .  these 
sentences do not entai l that the speaker believes p (nor do they entail p), inferences 
trigger the interpretation that the speaker comes to believe p, but on the basis of 
evidence insufficient to justify knowledge. (Note that in the situation just described 
above, where the speaker knows that his perceptions are not always reliable, it is 
appropriate to use an indirect evidential upon seeing or hearing John sing.) 
While languages like English express evidentiality lexically, other languages 
grarnmaticize evidentiality in their inflectional morphology or in their complemen­
tizer system (cf. Willett 1 988 ,  Palmer 1 986 for examples) . Languages differ in how 
detai led a distinction of evidential categories they make (cf. note 4) . According 
to Willett ( 1 988) ,  it is quite common for languages to have grarnmaticized only a 
two-way distinction between direct and indirect evidence, and typically, it is the 
indirect evidential that is morphologically marked. This  is  exactly the case in  the 
languages with the perfect of evidentiality :  the PE-morphology marks both reports 
and inferences and sentences without the PE-morphology are interpreted as based 
on direct evidence, i .e. on evidence justifying belief. 
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3. Semantics for Indirect Evidentials 
As became clear in the previous section, indirect evidentials, like the perfect of 
evidentiality or English apparent�v, are semantically propositional operators. Sen­
tences of the form Evp, where Ev stands for the indirect evidentiality operator, 
result in the interpretation that p is possible, very l ikely, or necessary relative to 
the knowledge state of the speaker. In other words, the indirect evidentiality oper­
ator Ev is an episternic modal .6 Under the report interpretation, depending on the 
source, Evp can have a variable modal reading, anywhere between weak possibi lity 
to necessity, i .e .  in its report reading, ( 1 )  can mean I may have come, I probably 
came, or I must have come, (given what X says) . The more trustworthy X is ,  the 
closer to universal the modal interpretation. The modal force of the Ev operator in 
the case of the inferential interpretation is universal, i .e . ,  in its inference reading, ( 1 )  
i s  interpreted along the lines of I must have come. This  i s  so because i n  stereotypical 
contexts, reasoning is  considered a highly reliable source of (indirect) evidence. 
It is clear that the variability in the modal interpretation of indirect eviden­
tiality statements comes from context; it is therefore possible to give a uniform 
interpretation to the Ev-operator. My proposal about the semantic contribution of 
Ev is summarized in (8) :  
(8) The Interpretation of Evp:  
a. Assertion: 0 p in view of the speaker s know/edge state 
b. Presupposition : Speaker has indirect evidence for p 
In other words, Ev is a universal epi stemic modal with a presupposition of avai lable 
indirect evidence for the truth of the proposition it modifies . 
In explicating the meaning of the episternic modal operator Ev I adopt 
Kratzer 's ( 1 99 1 )  enriched system of possible worlds semantics. Modal words are 
analyzed as existential or universal quantifiers over possible worlds. In addition 
to contributing a modal (quantificational) force, modals are associated with two 
contextually determined parameters: a MODAL BASE and an ORDERING SOURCE, 
both functions from worlds to sets of propositions. The epistemic modal base 
assigns to every possible world w the set of propositions that are known in  w. Since 
in possible worlds semantics propositions are identified with the sets of worlds in 
which they are true, ultimately the modal base specifies for every world a set of 
worlds accessible from it ,  epistemic accessibility being defined as compatibi lity 
relative to a knowledge state . The ordering source, an innovation to possible worlds 
analysis of modality, imposes a particular ordering among the accessible worlds 
determined by the modal base. Worlds can be ordered, for instance, with respect to 
how close they are to what the normal course of events is in a given world .  Such 
a STEREOTYPICAL ordering source is  responsible for the statement in (9b) being 
interpreted as weaker than the one in (9a), rather than implying it (examples from 
Kratzer 1 99 1 ): 
(9) a. She climbed Mount Toby. 
b .  She must have climbed Mount Toby. 
If must was interpreted simply as a universal quantifier over the worlds accessible 
from w, then (9b) would indeed entai l (9a) in w. Taking into account the stereotypical 
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ordering source prevents thi s undesirable result. The ordering source assigns to 
every world the set of propositions that constitute what i s  nonnally the case in  that 
world, and imposes an ordering on the accessible worlds with respect to that set of 
propositions. Universal quantification is then only over the set of closest worlds. 
Since it i s  not necessary for w to be an element of the set of worlds that come c losest 
to what nonnally happens in w, (9b) will not entai l (9a) in w. 
This  brief outline of Kratzer 's  treatment of epistemic modality wil l  be suf­
ficient as a framework for discussing indirect evidentiality fonnally. In short, I 
propose that an ordering source, detennined by the speaker ' s  beliefs regarding the 
available evidence, is responsible for restricting the set of epistemically accessible 
worlds in  the domain of quantification. This results in having Evp statements not 
entail p, much like the case of (9a,b) , while providing for variability of inferences 
with respect to ' ordinary ' epistemic modals. But first, before going into the details 
of a more fonnal account, let us convince ourselves that the proposal i n  (8) is indeed 
justified. 
From the definition in (8) we can see that what distinguishes Ev from the 
'ordinary ' epistemic modal must is the presupposition of available indirect evidence. 
Often in treatments of epistemic modality, one finds that accessibil ity relations 
between possible worlds are determined on the basi s of what the available evidence 
is, with no finer distinctions being made between the kinds of evidence underlying 
inferences about propositions whose truth value is  unknown. It turns out, though, 
that distinguishing between the kinds of evidence involved in epistemic reasoning 
is  important for natural language. Compare the sentences in ( 1 0) (the examples in 
( 1 1 )  are their perfect of evidentiality equivalents 7) :  
( l 0) Knowing how much John likes wine . . .  
a. . . .  he must have drunk a l l  the wine yesterday. 
b. # . . .  he apparently drank all the wine yesterday. 
( 1 1 )  Knowing how much Ivan likes wine . . .  
a. . . .  toj tIjabva da  e izpil vsickoto vino vcera. 
he must is drunk all-the wine yesterday 
' . . .  he must have drunk all the wine yesterday. ' 
b. # . . . toj izpil vsickoto vino vcera. 
he drunk-PE all-the wine yesterday 
, . . .  he apparently drank all the wine yesterday. ' 
We can see that the proposition John likes wine a lot is sufficient to justify the use 
of epistemic must in ( l Oa) but not the use of apparent(v in ( l Ob) .  The indirect 
evidential requires that there is, roughly speaking, some observable result of John's  
drinking all the wine,  perhaps many empty bottles or someone's  account of the event 
of drinking. 
The same point i s  i l lustrated in the contrast between ( 1 2) and ( 1 3 ) .  The 
speaker can continue an epi stemic statement must p with acknowledgment that she 
or he lacks evidence for p, but this i s  not possible in the case of EVp. Of course, 
must sti l l  requires the existence of some set of known propositions to serve as a 
premise for the epistemic inference and this is why the second continuation i n  ( 1 2) 
is ruled out . 
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( 1 2) A: John must have drunk all the wine. 
A': But I have no evidence for that. 
A': (# But I have no reason for believing that . )  
( 1 3) A: Ivan izpil  vsickoto vino vcera. 
Ivan drunk-PE all-the wine yesterday 
' Ivan apparently drank all the wine yesterday. ' 
A' : # But I have no evidence for that. 
In sum, the requirement that there be avai lable evidence is indeed part of the 
interpretative contribution of Ev, in contrast to epi stemic must. Next, it can be 
shown that the evidence can only be indirect, i .e .  it cannot be sufficient to justify 
a belief in  the core proposition. Neither the perfect of evidentiality in ( 1 4) nor its 
English equivalent with apparently accepts following assertions to the effect that 
the speaker has prior belief, or has evidence justifying a belief, that Maria kissed 
Ivan. 
( 1 4) A: Maria celunala Ivan . 
Maria kiss-PE Ivan 
'Maria apparently kissed Ivan . ' 
A': # (Actually) I witnessed it.! # (Actually) I know that for a fact. 
It i s  reasonable at this  point to ask the question: Could it be the case that the 
requirement that the evidence only be indirect i s  simply a cancellable implicature? 
In other words, given that the speaker had a choice to assert p, by not doing so she 
or he indicates that no stronger evidence is available to herlhim. Conversational 
implicatures of this sort are cancellable, though, which, as we have just seen in ( 1 4) ,  
i s  not the case with the perfect of evidentiality and apparently.s Having concluded 
that the inference of available indirect evidence is  not a cancellable implicature, 
it is sti ll necessary to convince ourselves that it is also not part of the assertion 
of EVp.  The standard negation tests show that the evidential interpretation i s  a 
presupposition. Negating perfect of evidentiality statements and statements with 
apparently results in the interpretation that the core proposition i s  being negated, 
not the avai lab i lity of indirect evidence:9  
( 1 5) a. Apparently, Ivan didn 't pass the exam. I O  
b .  Ivan ne izkaral lzplta. 
Ivan not passed-PE the-exam 
= ' Ivan didn 't pass the exam (it is saidJI infer) . '  
#- ' It i s  not the case that { it i s  saidJI infer} that Ivan passed the exam' . 
Simi larly, contradicting an assertion Evp, as in ( 1 6), challenges p, not the evidence 
p is  based on: 
( 1 6) A :  Ivan izkaral izpita. 
Ivan passed-PE the-exam 
Apparently, Ivan passed the exam. 
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B: This isn 't true. 
= ' It is not true that Ivan passed the exam. ' 
=I- ' It is not true that { it is said! you infer} that Ivan passed the exam. ' 
To summarize what has been accomplished so far, we have seen that the 
indirect evidentiality operator has the assertion of a modal and is  associated with 
a presupposition that the core proposition is based on indirect evidence. The last 
points that remain to be discussed, concerning the semantic contribution of EY, as 
outlined in (8), are the modal force of Ev and the epistemic nature of the modal 
base . Let us consider the former i ssue first. Presumably, it can be argued that at 
least in the case of apparently, the universal force is lexically specified. I don 't 
see a way of ruling out this  possibility, but I have several considerations against it. 
One can i l lustrate the universal specification of modals like must and necessarily 
by comparing them to their duals maylcan and possib�v, respectively. The same 
cannot be done for apparent�v, so adopting a lexical specification approach amounts 
to little more than a stipulation. Another argument comes from the analysis of 
attitude verbs like !mow, believe, wish as modal operators; adopting such an account 
results in treating these verbs as universal quantifiers over worlds compatible with 
the speaker's knowledge state, believes, or desires. I I Instead of saying that these 
verbs, too, are lexically specified for their universal force, a better approach will 
be to find a common explanation for the fact that the various operators, which are 
not in any obvious way lexically specified to mean must/necessari�v, end up being 
interpreted as universal quantifiers. Finally, in the case of the PE morphology, 
the goal of the present proposal is to derive the meaning of indirect evidentiality 
compositionally, i .e .  by identifying a common underspecified representation for the 
present perfect and for the indirect evidential .  Bui lding a universal quantifier into 
the underspecified set of features will interfere with the semantics of the present 
perfect. 1 2  
A second attempt at accounting for the universal force of  indirect evidentials 
i s  to say that a null necessity operator co-occurs with the PE morphology and with 
apparently, i .e. that Ev i s  not contributed by these elements but is a separate non­
overt operator. Yet this  will amount to denying the modal role of apparently and of 
the PE morphology altogether and will raise the question of what their interpretative 
function is, if not that of contributing the modality themselves. In section 4, in fact, 
I present arguments that in PE statements the morphology does not play a temporal 
or aspectual role, which supports the view that it is the source of the modality. 
Thus, the position which I adopt is  that only the quantificational force of Ey 
is non-overt; the PE morphology and apparentZv are obviously lexical, but they only 
contribute the intensionality and specify the kind of modality involved. A semantic 
decomposition of the modal is  not in  itself controversial, it is in fact part of Kratzer 's 
( 1 99 1 )  three-parameter analysi s of modality (as involving modal force, modal base, 
and ordering source); what is  novel and more unusual is that the quantificational 
properties are argued here to be separate from the intensional operator, and that the 
latter can be lexicalized without the former being expressed overtly. 
In the proposal advocated here, the PE morphology and apparently are modal 
operators whose quantificational force is not specified. Some default mechanism is  
responsible for determining that force as universal . While I do not  have a specific 
solution as to why the default interpretation is  universal, this  interpretation should 
perhaps come as no surpri se, considering that the quantificational force of Ey is 
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not expressed overtly. It is known that non-overt operators tend to have univer­
sal interpretation, consider for instance Kratzer 's ( 1 986) proposal that conditional 
clauses be analyzed as restrictors of a covert must, or the idea that there is  a generic 
null operator in generic  sentencesI 3 ,  or the case of attitude verbs discussed above.  
Without, of course, being explained, the universal force of Ev is at  least consi stent 
with that of other non-overt modals. 
The epistemic interpretation ofEv raises another interesting question. Overt 
modals typically allow for a range of interpretations: epistemic, deontic, dynamic,  
etc . It i s  p lausible to suggest, that, in the case of apparently, interpretation relative 
to knowledge state is lexically specified. In the case of the perfect of evidentiality, 
however, it is not immediately clear why the episternic interpretation is the only 
one available. An interesting hypothesis to pursue i s  that there is non-tIivial affinity 
between temporal operators and modal operators of the epistemic kind. Some 
suggestions regarding thi s  issue will be made in section 5 .  
Let u s  now turn t o  formalizing the proposal about the semantic contribution 
of Ev. As noted above, the proposal i s  set within the general framework of Kratzer 
( 1 99 1 ) . Let W be the set of possible worlds and let fbe the function that assigns 
to every possible world the set of propositions that constitute the avai lable indirect 
evidence (for the core proposition) in that world. The propositions in f(w) are 
obviously known in that world but this is a more restricted set than the ' ordinary ' 
epistemic what is known in w, since, as we saw in the discussion regarding examples 
( 1 0)-( 1 3) ,  it i s  not sufficient for a proposition to be known for it to be considered 
(indirect) evidence for the core proposition . f(w) may include propositions like 
Mary says that p or There are empty wine bottles in John s office; the former wil l  
yield a report interpretation for Evp and the latter an inference interpretation. The 
domain of quantification of Ev is initially nr(w) , the set of worlds in which all 
propositions that are considered evidence in  w, are true. 
( 1 7) f(w) = {p :  speaker considers p indirect evidence in w} 
nf(w) = {uE W: 'lip[(P i s  the indirect evidence in w) � UEp]}  
The actual domain of  quantification is  restricted by the ordering source. Let g be 
the function that assigns to every possible world the set of propositions represent­
ing the speaker 's beliefs concerning the available indirect evidence (for the core 
proposition) in that world.  This set may include propositions like Nonnally, Mary 
is reliable as a source of in/onnation or If there are empty wine bottles in someone s 
office, that person has drank the wine. The set of propositions g(w) imposes an 
ordering <g(w) on W such that for all u, vE W, v is closer to the ideal set by g(w) 
than u is ,  iff all propositions in g(w) which are true in u are true in v and there are 
propositions in g(w) which are true in v and which are not true in U . 1 4  
( 1 8) g(w) = {p :  speaker believes p with respect to the indirect evidence in w}  
For 'Ii u,v E W:  v <g(",) u iff {p :  pE g(w) 1\ UEp }  C {p :  pEg(w) 1\ VEp }  
An indirect evidentiality statement Evp i s  true in a world w with respect t o  the 
conversational backgrounds provided by fand g, iff P is true in all worlds accessible 
from w which come closest to the ideal represented by the speaker 's beliefs regarding 
the avai lable indirect evidence in w. 
( 1 9) [EVp ] 1,g = {wE W: 'liuE W [(UE nf(w) 1\ ..,:JvE W (vE nf(w) 1\ v<g(w)u» � 
UEp] 
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In the di scussion above we saw that it i s  not necessary to bui ld the report and 
inference interpretations in the meaning of the indirect evidentiality operators PE 
and apparently. Contextually determined facts that enter the restrictor of the modal 
operator ensure that the one or the other interpretation arises. It is now necessary to 
see how the variabi li ty in the quantificational force is brought into effect. 
Consider first the case where the indirect evidence determining the modal 
base is a rumor that p and the ordering source concerns the reliability of rumors. If 
the world of evaluation w is such that rumors are normally right, we wil l  consider 
those accessible worlds where it is true that there is a rumor that p and that rumors 
are right; Evp wil l  assert that all those worlds are p-worlds. The interpreted modal 
force is therefore close to universal (it is weaker than universal for reasons similar 
to those discussed in relation to the examples in (9); though rumors are normally 
right in  w, the particular rumor need not be) .  If, however, rumors are considered 
very unreliable as evidence, the set of accessible worlds where it is true that there 
is rumor that p and the rumor is right will be very restricted; hence, the resulting 
interpretation that p is only slightly possible in w. Finally, let us consider the 
inferential interpretation of Ev .  Let the indirect evidence be the presence of empty 
wine bottles in John 's  office and g(w) contain the proposition Jfthere are empty wine 
bottles in someone s office, that person has drank them. Then the quantification is  
only over those accessible worlds where there are empty wine bottles in John 's 
office and which come closest to the ideal set by the conditional; all these worlds, 
then, are asserted to be p-worlds. Since the speaker believes w to be such world, it 
follows that the speaker believes p is true in w. 
Before we turn to the discussion of the aspects of the semantics of the 
present perfect that are relevant for the evidential interpretation, it is necessary to 
establish that the present perfect morphology is playing a strictly modal role and is 
not responsible for a present perfect interpretation . If indeed perfect of evidentiality 
sentences were interpreted as ordinary present perfects, as far as tense and aspect are 
concerned, then arguably, the present perfect morphology would be simply playing 
its normal function with the modal interpretation coming from somewhere else; 
or, at most, the present perfect morphology would somehow facilitate the modal 
interpretation but crucial ly, would not contribute it. The goal of the next section is 
thus to i l lustrate that perfect of evidentiality statements do not have the temporal 
and aspectual characteri stics of present perfects. What this  means is that the source 
of modality is indeed the present perfect morphology. 
4. Temporal and Aspectual Differences Between PE and The Present Perfect 
Even though the indirect evidential employs the morphology of the present perfect, 
the temporal and aspectual meanings of the two are clearly distinct. (In )compatibility 
with ce11ain adverbials and with certain types of predicates can serve to test the inter­
pretational di fferences with respect to tense and aspect between the present perfect 
and the evidential forms. The conclusion is that the latter always have the temporal 
and aspectual meaning of their corresponding indicative forms.  I S  
Let us consider first the evidential forms of  the aorist. Adverbial tests for 
the perfect-aorist distinction (McCoard 1 978,  among others) are based on the fact 
that the aorist in English is i ncompatible with adverbials like at present, up till now. 
lateZv, which are acceptable with the present perfect, whereas the present perfect is 
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incompatible with adverbials the aorist is happy to accept like last night, at 3pm, 
in 1 9 78. Testing the compatibility with adverbials of this  kind clearly shows that 
in languages with the perfect of evidentiality, the present perfect and the evidential 
forms of the aorist behave differently. The fol lowing sentences i llustrate this l 6 :  
(20) a. Te sa  dosli (??vcera)/ (??snosti)/ (??tocno v 3 casal . 
they are come-P.PART yesterday/ last night! exactly at 3 o ' clock 
' *They have come yesterday/last night! exactly at 3 o 'clock . '  
b .  Te dosli vcera/ snosti/ tocno v 3 casa. 
they come-PE yesterday/ last night! exactly at 3 o 'clock 
'They apparently came yesterday/last night!exactly at 3 o ' clock . '  
We see that there i s  a contrast in  acceptability between the present perfect in (20a) 
and the perfect of evidentiality example in (20b), the former precluding modification 
by adverbials like yesterday and the latter allowing such modification. A sharper 
contrast is provided by the compari son of the present perfect to the evidential forms 
of the present . These forms behave differently from the present perfect in their 
compatibi lity with moment-of-speech oriented adverbials like right now, at this 
very moment. Thi s  is i l lustrated in the following sentences: 
(2 1 )  a. Toj e pisel pismo (*tocno segall ( *tocno v tozi moment) .  
he is written-p.PART letter right now/ right in thi s  moment 
' *He has written a letter right now/ at thi s  very moment . '  
b .  Toj pisel pismo tocno segal tocno v tozi moment. 
he written-PE letter right now/ right in this  moment 
'He is apparently writing a letter right now/ at thi s  very moment. '  
A s  the perfect o f  evidentiality statement i n  (2 1 b )  receives a present temporal speci­
fication, it is compatible with adverbials like right now. 
Another telling case about the difference in interpretation between the 
present perfect and the perfect of evidentiality is compatibility with individual­
level predicates. Individual-level predicates are known to be incompatible with the 
perfect (when unmodified) l 7 .  Hence the ungrammaticality of the following sentence 
as a present perfect but its acceptability as a perfect of evidentiality: 
(22) Dve pljus dye (*e) bilo ravno na cetiri . 
two plus two (be-3sG) been equal to four 
' * Two plus two has equaled four. ' 
'Two plus two apparently equals/equaled foUf. ' 
Einstein-sentences provide another test for the temporal and aspectual inter­
pretation of perfect of evidentiality statements. As noted in the literature on aspect, 
the present perfect is incompatible with topics that for one reason or another do not 
conform to a requirement of current relevance (cf. McCoard 1 978)  or participant 
property at reference time. In particular, it has been observed that sentences like 
(23a), in contrast to the aori st (cf. (23b) , are unacceptable on a reading where Ein­
stein is  the topic, since Einstein i s  no longer alive. (The present perfect i s  acceptable 
on a reading where Princeton is  the topic of the sentence.) 
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(23) a. # Einstein has visited Princeton . 
b. Einstein visited Princeton. 
Consider now (24) . The fact that the perfect of evidentiality is fully acceptable 
where the present perfect fai ls in  producing a grammatical sentence, means that the 
perfect of evidentiality does not receive the temporal and aspectual interpretation 
of a present perfect. 
(24) Ajnstajn (#e) poseti l Prinstiin . 
Einstein (be-3sG) visited Princeton 
'# Einstein has visited Princeton . '  
'Einstein apparently visited Princeton . '  
To sum up the findings o f  thi s  section, the evidential present and aorist, both 
formed morphologically like the present perfect, do not receive the interpretation 
of a present perfect but have the temporal and aspectual interpretation of indicative 
present and aorist, respectively. Therefore, in perfect of evidentiality statements, 
the morphology of the present perfect does not play its usual temporal-aspectual 
role; instead its contribution is that of an epistemic modal. The next section aims to 
provide a semantic explanation for the modal function of the present perfect. 
5. The Contribution of the Present Perfect 
Before going into the detai ls of my proposal about the semantic contribution of the 
present perfect to the interpretation of indirect evidentiality, I will briefly review 
Iatridou 's ( 1 996) analysis of the role of past tense morphology in counterfactuals ;  
first, because my account owes a great deal to I atridou 's analysi s of the past­
counterfactual connection, and second, because the two phenomena are similar in  
many respects and a comparison between them could be beneficial for a better 
understanding of the interaction between temporal and modal categories. 
5. 1 .  The Past-Counteifactual Connection 
The past-counterfactual connection is manifested in the typological generalization 
that in  many languages past tense morphology is  linked to irrealis  interpretation. 
The use of past tense in  complements of wish, as in J wish 1 had more time, and 
in conditionals If J had more time, J would visit him, triggers the counterfactual 
inference J don 't have (enough) time. Some accounts of the past-counterfactual 
connection treat past tense not as a primitive but merely as one of the manifestations 
of a more general semantic category REMOTE (cf. Isard 1 974) . Iatridou ( 1 996)  
provides a formalization of the phenomenon in terms of EXCLUSION (or, rather, 
non-inclusion) frame operating over the domain of temporal intervals or possible 
worlds. In particular, she bases her analysis on the observation in Klein ( 1 994) that 
the role of past tense is not to assert the existence of an eventuality prior to the 
moment of speech (or, to use his terminology, to assert that the TIME OF S ITUATION 
(TS it) precedes the TIME OF UTTERANCE (TU» ; if that were the case the use of past 
tense in examples like (25) would be at best infelicitous, as under the most natural 
interpretation the state of the book being in Russian extends through the moment of 
speech into the future. 
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(25) (There was a book on the table.) The book was in Russian . 
Past tense, according to Klein,  simply signals that the interval for which the assertion 
i s  made, the TOPIC DME (IT), i s  in the past relative to TV. 
latridou proposes that the precedence relationship between the time intervals 
IT and TV, the fact that TT i s  not included in the interval TV, translates in  the 
domain of modality into the assertion that the set of worlds quantified over extends 
beyond the set of epistemically accessible worlds, resulting in a counterfactual 
interpretation. The essence of latridou 's proposal i s  represented in (26): 
(26) a. D(w) rt. C(w) 
b. D(t) rt. C(t) 
D(w) : the contextual domain of (world) quantification (Topic Sphere) 
C(w) : the set of worlds that for all we know are the present world 
D(t) : the contextual domain of (time) quantification (Topic  Time) 
C(t) : the set of times that for all we know are the present time 
In other words, latlidou accounts for the past-counterfactual connection by i denti­
fying the common semantic elements between the temporal and the modal category 
and by assigning past morphology a meaning underspecified as to the type of argu­
ments involved, time intervals or possible worlds. 
5.2. The Common Semantic Strncture of PE and the Present Perfect 
I assume a definition of the present perfect which is generally agreed upon, namely, 
that the present perfect asserts that the consequent state of an eventuality having 
culminated holds at the time of utterance (Moens 1 987, Parsons 1 990, Steedman 
1 994, Giorgi and Pianesi 1 996, a .o .) 1 8 .  A sentence like John has left asserts that 
a certain state currently holds, which is the consequent state of the event of John ' s  
leaving. I propose that determining the meaning of  indirect evidentiality are the 
following relationships introduced by the present perfect: (i) the consequent state 
of a past eventuality holding at a given time interval t, i .e. hold (CS(e), t) and 
..., hold (e, t) , which i s  the contribution of the perfect; and (ii) ,  the consequent 
state holding at the time of utterance, the contribution of the present tense. In the 
neo-Reichenbachian framework of Klein 19, these translate into the requirements that 
TSit Cf: IT and TT � TV.20 The fact that the core eventuality necessarily does not 
hold at TV is a di stinguishing characteristics of the present perfect in comparison 
to the simple past : compare the (unmodified) present perfect in (27) to (25) above.  
(27) *The book has been in Russian. 
I will next make the following assumptions. Adopting the general approach 
of defining correspondences in the temporal and modal domains, outlined in the 
previous subsection, I propose that the epi stemic counterpart of an eventuality e 
holding at an interval t, hold (e, t) , is the interpretation of a proposition p (where 
p results from giving e a temporal specification) being known in a set of possible 
worlds. Let us further accept that corresponding to TV, we have the set of worlds 
epistemically accessible from the world ofthe speaker, Ws . Just like TV i s  a speaker­
anchored deictic center on the time l ine, nf(w s) is a speaker-anchored deictic center 
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in W. Similarly, corresponding to TT, we have the Topic  Sphere, the set of worlds 
in  the domain of quantification. 
The temporal contribution of the present perfect, namely the inference that 
the core eventuality does not hold in TU, or that TSit C1 TU, has as a correlate 
in the modal domain the inference that the set of worlds in which p is known are 
excluded from nf(ws) , i .e .  they are epistemically inaccessible from Ws . In other 
words, the resulting interpretation is that the speaker has no direct evidence for 
p .  This gives us part of the desired semantics. What we further need to do is  to 
derive the presupposition of available indirect evidence by restricting the domain 
of quantification to only those worlds in which the speaker has indirect evidence 
for p .  Recall that the present perfect has the interpretation that the consequent 
state of the core eventuality holds at TU. By our convention, this  corresponds to an 
interpretation that the proposition p', derived by giving the state CS(e) a temporal 
specification, is known in nr(w) . In other words, we arrive at the interpretation that 
in Ws E nr(w) the speaker knows the proposition p'=There are consequences/results 
0/ p, or in other words, the speaker has indirect evidence for p. Recall at thi s  
point that the present tense morphology is  crucial for the perfect of evidentiality 
interpretation (cf. examples (3)-(6) for the fact that the indirect evidentiality reading 
i s  not available in  non-finite environments, as well  as in the past and future perfects) . 
It is now clear why this should be so. The fact that CS(e) holds at TU and that e does 
not hold at TU were both crucial, under the analysis proposed here, for deriving the 
interpretation of indirect evidentiality. 
In summary, I argued in thi s  subsection that the morphology of the present 
pelfect contributes to either the tcmporal interpretation of propositions (by imposing 
a particular ordering between time intervals), or to their evidential status (by im­
posing particular relations between possible worlds). A compositional account was 
given to the contribution of the present perfect, as the role of both the perfect and 
the prescnt tense morphology in deriving the modal interpretation was identified. 
Needless to say, many more important questions need to be addressed, in particular, 
both the notions of consequent state and of indirect evidence need a more exact for­
mulation ; simi larly, further formalization is needed to reduce the correspondences 
identified here between the temporal and modal domains to a single meaning for the 
present perfect, which, given the right argwnents, will produce as output a temporal 
or a modal construct . Sti l l ,  I believe that even formulating these questions is an 
important step towards our bettcr understanding of the links between temporal and 
modal categories, and as such the proposal advanced here is  of relevance for theories 
of temporality and epistemic modal ity. 
5.3. Past as Counter/actual vs. Present Peifect as Evidential 
It is the goal of this subsection to briefly compare the two phenomena, known so 
far to exhibit a peculiar syncretism of temporal and modal categories. Both the 
past-counterfactual connection and the present perfect-evidential connection are 
characterized by temporal categories receiving in certain cases the interpretation 
of epistemic modals .  Iatridou 's ( 1 996) analysis and the proposal developed here 
aim at providing an account of why it is possible for the past tense and the present 
perfect morphology, respectively, to take on a modal role; in answering thi s question, 
it turns out that the different temporal relations introduced by the past tense and 
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the present perfect can account in a systematic way for the two, quite different 
interpretations, of counterfactuality and of indirect evidentiality. An interesting 
consequence of the accounts is  that they predict that the counterfactual interpretation 
is an implicature (as pointed out in Stalnaker 1 975 a.o.) ,  whereas the evidential 
meaning i s  not. Recall, that in the case of the past tense, the temporal relation 
IT ct TU translates into the interpretation that the domain of quantification is not 
over the set of worlds epistemically accessible from Ws ; it i s  predicated of worlds 
epi sternically inaccessible from Ws that they are p-worlds but no assertion is being 
made about Ws . It follows then, that the interpretation of counterfactuality, i . e .  that 
w., is not a p-world, can only be an implicature (cf. Iatridou 1 996) .  In the case 
of the present perfect, as TT � TU, the corresponding modal relation is that of the 
Topic  Sphere consisting of the episternically accessible worlds; it thus follows that 
the meaning of avai lable indirect evidence in Ws cannot be an implicature. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I discussed a typological generalization concerning a connection be­
tween the present perfect and the category of evidentiality. After discussing the 
nature of evidentiality, and providing an analysis of indirect evidentials as epistemic 
modals of a sort, I offered an account of the present-perfect evidential connec­
tion based on the semantics of the present perfect. The proposal devcloped here 
has a number of implications. It makes finer distinctions in the family of epi stemic 
modals and shows that natural language distinguishes between the types of evidence 
involved in epistemic reasoning. The proposal also reveals that the close relation­
ship between modality and temporality extends beyond the conceptual similarities 
between the two and that temporal and modal structures in natural language, not just 
in the interpretative module, are in fact, composed of some of the same elements.  
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Chung-hye Han, Manfred Krifka, Ellen Prince, Anoop Sarkar, and Mark Steedman . 
Errors and inconsi stencies remain my responsibi lity. 
1 Languages, established so far to exhibit the phenomenon, are: Afro-Asiatic: Arabic 
(Negev Bedouin); Indo-European: Albanian, Bulgarian, Icelandic, Macedonian, 
Norwegian , Romani,  Tajik; Niger-Congo: Dogon ;  South Caucasian: Georgian; 
Turkic: Turkish, Turkmen, and Uzbek; Ural ic: Estonian ,  Finnish, Komi, Mari , 
Mansi, Nenets, Udmurt. This l ist is based partly on Comrie 1 976 (cf. references in 
Nedjalkov 1 988 ,  a .o . ;  note also that it i s  bcyond the scope of this  paper to provide 
comprehensive references to work on evidentiality, or even on the perfect-evidential 
connection). As he notes, areal influence from Turkic could probably account for 
the di stribution of the phenomenon in Georgian ,  Bulgarian, and Albanian, but for 
some of the Uralic languages at least, it must be an independent development. 
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'1 use REPORT and INFERENCE simply as convenient labels for the range of inter­
pretations allowed by indirect evidentials. My position i s  that we do not truly have 
a case of ambiguity here; the report reading is the weaker reading, according to 
which the speaker does not necessari ly come to believe p; the inference reading is a 
stronger one, in which the speaker comes to believe p, yet does not have ajustified 
belief, i .e . ,  knowledge (cf. note 5) in p (and that is why fai ls to assert p). The 
report/inference distinction will be discussed later in more detail .  
3 And finally, the interpretation is  available even with sentences in the first person (as 
i llustrated in ( 1 »  which are pragmatically less favorable to such an interpretation . 
4 A summary of typical evidential distinctions in terms of source of evidence can 
be found in Willet ( 1 988), a typological study of 38 languages with grammatical 
evidential systems, and also in Palmer ( 1 986) .  There are languages, for instance, 
which mark finer distinctions within the categories of report (hearsay or folklore) 
and inference (inference based on observable results or on reasoning) . 
5Jn thi s  paper I will use JUSTIFIED BELIEF and KNOWLEDGE interchangeably. Often 
in  the philosophical literature a distinction is  made between the two, knowledge 
being identified with justified true belief. Yet in  natural language it i s  rarely, if  at 
all, useful to talk about the truth of propositions in absolute terms since speakers are 
not omniscient. The term JUSTIFIED is not completely uncontroversial (see Gettier 
1 963,  Feldman 1 974) ; I usc it in the sense of BASED ON SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE where 
what counts as sufficient and what not is context-dependent. 
6 S ince Evp statements do not assert p, various entai lments fai l  to obtain .  For 
instance neither John apparent�v saw a unicorn/made a cake nor their perfect of 
evidentiality equivalents in (i) (from Bulgarian), entail the existence of unicorns or 
the coming into exi stence of a cake : 
(i) Ivan vidjal ednorog/ napravil torta. 
Ivan see-PE unicorn/ make-PE cake 
' Ivan apparently saw a unicorn/made a cake . '  
7Examples o f  P E  here and elsewhere from now o n  are from Bulgarian. You may 
have noticed that in the PE example in ( 1 1 b) the auxiliary is missing. In Bulgarian, 
while in the I st and 2nd persons the morphology of the PE is identical to that of 
the present perfect (cf. (I b» , the 3rd person auxiliary is dropped in  the case of PE 
(and retained in the present perfect) with only the past participle remaining.  As 
pointed out to me by both Manfred Kritka and Sabine latridou, there i s  probably a 
semantic reason for the person di stinctions; at thi s  point though I have no sati sfactory 
explanation. 
bIn particular, compare the impossible continuations in ( 1 4) to the acceptable dis­
course in (i), i l lustrating a standard case of cancelling a conversational implicature: 
(i) A: What do you think of John and Bill? 
B :  Bil l  is smart. I In fact/actually, John i s  smart, too 
9Note also, that negation receives lower scope than the modal operator, just as it 
happens in ' ordinary ' epistemic modals (cf. John mustn 't be at home). 
l ° It is crucial that apparent�v be interpreted as scntential modifier and not as a VP­
modifier. In John didn i APPARENTLYpass the exam, apparently, especially when 
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stressed, can be interpreted below negation. See Brennan 1 993 for discussion of 
various syntactic and semantic issues concerning the scope of modal operators . 
1 1  That is ,  John believes that Mary is sman receives the interpretation that in all 
worlds compatible with what John believes in  the current world, Mary i s  smart. 
1 'Consider for instance the truth-conditions assigned to the present perfect by EX­
TENDED NOW theories (McCoard 1 978,  Dowty 1 979, a.o.) according to which PR 
PERFECT P is true i fp is true for some subinterval of an interval of which the present 
is the final subinterval. 
1 3Cases of the actual interpretation being close to universal, rather than universal, 
can be analyzed along the lines of (9b) . 
1 4The definition of ordering adopted here differs from Kratzer 's formulation. 
1 5 What I mean by corresponding indicative forms i s  the following. The morpho­
logical system of the perfect of evidentiality is completely parallel to the indicative 
system. Corresponding to every indicative tense/aspect form i s  an indirect evidential 
form, with the correspondence being systematic - the present perfect morphology. 
In the case of indicative perfects, the corresponding evidentials have a double ' layer ' 
of perfect morphology: 
(i) Az sam bil eel "Ana Karenina" . 
I be- 1 SG, PRES be-p.PART read-p'pART Anna Karenina 
'I have apparently read Anna Karenina . '  
In  (i) , which is  an  indirect evidential based on  an  indicative present perfect, the 
auxi liary of the perfect is itself in the perfect of evidentiality morphology. 
1 6Throughout thi s  section 3rd person forms are used to differentiate between the 
present perfect and the perfect of evidentiality; recall that in Bulgarian the evidential 
forms do not have the auxiliary in the 3rd persons. 
1 71t i s  possible to say Two plus two has always equaled four. 
1 8The required aspectual type of the past eventuality and the exact notion of conse­
quent state vary between some of the analyses. 
1 9The neo-Reichenbachian framework is considered primarily for ease of compari­
son with Iatridou's analysi s of the counterfactual role of past tense. 
,oThe requirement that the core eventuality be culminated (or that TSit Cf:. TT) i s  
contradicted only by  the existence of English perfects which take states a s  inputs 
as in 1 have known John since 1 990; the possibility of thi s UNNERSAL PERFECT, 
however, appears to be cross-linguistically restricted; therefore the relevance of (i) 
for the link with evidentiality is  not necessari ly compromised. 
References 
Brennan, V. ( 1 993) .  Root and Epistemic Modal Auxiliary Verbs in English. Ph.D. 
thesis ,  University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 
Chafe, W. and J. Nichols. ( 1 986) .  Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Episte­
mology. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Comrie, B.  ( 1 976). Aspect: An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and 
Related Problems. Cambridge: CUP. 
THE PRESENT PERFECT AS AN EPISTEMIC MODAL 
Dowty, D. ( 1 979). Word Meaning in Montague Grammar. Dordrecht: Reidel .  
Feldman, R. ( 1 974). "An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples", Australian 
Journal of Philo sophy 52 , 1 , 68-69. 
Gettier, E .  ( 1 963). "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", Ana(vsis 23 , 6 ,  1 2 1 - 1 23 .  
Giorgi , A .  and E Pianesi . ( 1 996). Tense andAspect: from Semantics to Morphosyn­
tax. Book manuscript. [To appear. Oxford University Press] 
Iatridou, S. ( 1 996). "The Grammatical Ingredients of Counterfactuality" ms. 
UPenn. 
Isard, S .  ( 1 974). "What would you have done if' Theoretical Linguistics 1 , 233-5 5 .  
Klein,  W. ( 1 994). Time in Language. London: Routledge. 
Kratzer, A .  ( 1 986). "Conditionals", CLS 1 - 1 5 .  
Kratzer, A .  ( 1 99 1 ) . "Modality" i n  A .  von Stechow and D .  Wunderli ch (eds.) 
An International Handbook of Contemporary Research, 639-650 .  Berlin de 
Gruyter. 
Lyons, 1. ( 1 977). Semantics, vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McCoard, R.w. ( 1 978) .  The English Perfect: Tense Choice and Pragmatic Infer­
ences, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Moens, M.  ( 1 987) .  Tense, Aspect, and Temporal Reference. Ph .D. diss. University 
of Edinburgh. 
Nedjalkov, V. ( 1 988) .  Typology ofResultative Constructions. Amsterdam! Phi ladel-
phia: John Benjamins.  
Palmer, ER. ( 1 986).  Mood and Modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .  
Parsons, T. ( 1 990). Events in the Semantics of English . Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Slobin, D. and A. Ak�u. ( 1 982) .  "Tense, Aspect, and Modality in  the Use of the 
Turkish Evidential" in P. Hopper (ed.) Tense-Aspect: Between Semantics and 
Pragmatics. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1 85-200. 
Stalnaker, R. ( 1 975) .  "Indicative Conditionals", Philosophia 5, 269-286 .  
Steedman, M. ( 1 994) . "Temporality" in  van Benthem, 1 .  and A. ter Meulen (eds.) 
Handbook of Logic and Language. Elsevier Science B. V. 
Willett, T. ( 1 988) "A Cross-Linguistic Survey of the Grammaticization of Eviden­
tiality" Studies in Language 1 2- 1 ,  5 1 -97.  
239 
